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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
KAREN SHUMANN MARCHANT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)

)
)
DONALD J. MARCHANT,
)
)
Defendant/Respondent. )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

v*

Supreme Court No. 860498
Civil No. 85-8-9605-2

ooOoo
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
As a result of the trial held June 18, 1986 before the
Honorable Don V* Tibbs f Sixth Judicial District Court Judgef
Karen Shumann Marchant, Appellant, requests that this Court
review the following issues:
1.

The custody award of the parties1 two minor

children/ Sara Marchant and Brandon Marchant, to the Respondent/
Donald Marchant/ was an abuse of discretion of the Trial Judge.
2.

The evidence offered at trial regarding custody

does not support the Conclusions of Law that it is in the best
interests of the children that the Plaintiff be awarded permanent
custody.

3.

The Trial Court Judge failed to properly apply the

law to the facts in determining the best interests of the
children in making the custody award to Donald Marchant,
4.

The Trial Court1s failure to award Karen Marchant

alimony under the facts presented was an abuse of discretion and
a misapplication of law to the facts.
5.

The Trial Court's unequal distribution of Donald

Marchant1s pension plan was an abuse of discretion.
6.

The Trial Court's failure to award $15,000.00 to

Karen Marchant as separate property, which she had received from
a personal injury settlement, or its failure to consider the
amount in the property distribution, was an error in law.
7.

The Trial Court's award of interest on deferred

payments of the pension plan at less than the statutory rate was
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
8.

The Trial Court's failure to award attorney's fees

in light of Karen Marchant1s need and Don Marchant's ability to
pay was an abuse of discretion and a misapplication of law to
facts.
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
The following statutes require interpretation:
1.

Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1984, as amended),
- Attached.

2.

Section 30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. (1977, as amended),
- Attached.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant Karen Marchant initiated this divorce proceeding against her husband of 18 years, Donald Marchant, on
March 5, 1985, requesting custody of the parties' two minor
children, Brandon, age 12, and Sara, age 9, child support, alimony and an equitable division of the marital assets.

Donald

Marchant answered, denying that Mrs. Marchant should be awarded a
divorce or custody of the children.
Both parties initially moved for temporary custody of
the children and child support.

However, by Stipulation dated

August 28, 1985 and entered by the Court October 2, 1985, Donald
Marchant agreed that Karen Marchant should be awarded custody of
the children subject to his right of visitation, that he would
pay child support in the amount of $200.00 per month per child,
that the parties' home in Central, Utah, would be rented and that
Karen would move to Salt Lake City to reside with the children
until trial.

(A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A";

Stipulation and Order, Record pp. 17-19.)
reflected the status quo.

The Stipulation

Donald Marchant had moved from the

parties1 home in Central, Utah, in March, 1985 to a trailer home
at Karen Marchant1s request (Transcript, p. 76).
Karen Marchant resided in Salt Lake City with the
children from September, 1985 to June 18, 1986, the date of the
trial.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of

Divorce are appended hereto respectively as Exhibits "B" and "C"
(Record pp. 30-49) .

The Trial Court granted Karen Marchant's Petition for
Divorce.

However, it found that she was the cause for the mari-

tal breakup (Findings of Fact, para* 5.B., Record p. 32).
Judge Tibbs granted Respondent Donald Marchant custody
of Brandon and Sara, based upon the following Findings of Fact:
5.
In determining what is the best interests
of the children for purposes of determining
custody, the Court makes the following specific
findings:
A.
That both the Plaintiff and
Defendant are good parents, and that both parties
could be awarded custody of the minor children.
B.
That the marriage entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the
actions on the part of the Plaintiff, which were
not justified.
C.
That when the Plaintiff vacated the
family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt
Lake City, Utah, in September of 1985, she moved
into an apartment and in approximately November or
December of 1985, her sister, another woman who is
divorced, moved in with her, together with her
minor child. That the standard of living under
which Plaintiff has been residing while having the
temporary custody of the children in Salt Lake
City, Utah, is not what it should have been nor was
it in the best interests of the children.
D.
That during the latter part of the
marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff
became involved with another man and this fact had
an influence with the Court in determining what is
in the best interests of the minor children.
E.
That during the latter years of the
marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that
change was not in the best interests of the family
unit, but rather the change was pursuant to the
Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the
exclusion of the family unit.
(Record at pp. 31-32)

Karen was granted visitation of every other weekend/
every other holiday and six weeks in the summer, and was required
to make the children attend church each Sunday while in her care
(Findings of Fact/ para. 6, Record 33; Decree of Divorce,
para. 3r Record pp. 42-43).
No child support was awarded to Donald Marchant (Decree,
para. 7, Record p. 43).
The Court found that Karen Marchant was not entitled to
alimony but made no other specific Findings of Fact on the point.
(Findings, para. 8, Record p. 33, Decree, para. 5, Record p. 43.)
The parties1 home in Central, Utah, was awarded to
Donald Marchant, subject to a lien of one-half of the equity in
the amount of $17,000.00 in favor of Karen Marchant (Decree,
para. 6.A., Record p. 43).
The parties1 farm was determined to have a net equity of
$43f500.00 which was awarded equally to the parties in the amount
of $21/750.00 each (Decree, para. 6.B., at p. 44). Defendant was
ordered to pay Plaintiff $1,500.00 for the farm equipment in his
possession (Decree, para. 6.C., Record 44).
To satisfy the awards to the Plaintiff totalling
$40,250.00, the Court ordered that the farm be sold by June 18,
1987, and Karen Marchant would be entitled to the first
$40/250.00 from the sale (Decree, para. 6.D., pp. 45-46).
Donald Marchant1s pension plan with the United States
Government Forest Service was found to have a value of $18,000.00
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which was then vested; the Court awarded Mr, Marchant two-thirds
of the amount and Mrs. Marchant one-third of the amount,
requiring Mr. Marchant to pay $6,000.00 over ten years, in one
annual installment, the unpaid balance bearing interest at eight
percent per annum (Decree, para. 7, Record 47).
The Court found that Karen Marchant1s net monthly income
was $1,321.00 and Don Marchant's was $2,114.00 (Findings, para.
10, Record p. 37).
Each party was required to pay the debts which they
incurred individually from and after October 2, 1985, except that
Donald Marchant was required to pay medical and dental bills
incurred by Mrs. Marchant and Sara and Brandon (Decree, para. 9,
Record 47).
The Court found that neither party was entitled to an
award of attorney's fees (Decree, para. 10, Record p. 48).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Donald and Karen Marchant were married September 8, 1967
in Salt Lake City, Utah, and divorced June 18, 1986, after an 18
year marriage.

At the time of the divorce, Karen was 36 years

old and Donald was 43 years old.

Karen was 18 when they were

married and had completed one year of college.

Karen finished

one more year of college and quit school to work while her husband completed his education (Transcript, lines 1-11, p. 28).
Donald obtained a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering from
Brigham Young University (Transcript, lines 6-10, p. 71).
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Donald Marchant went to work for the United States
Forest Service after graduation, finally being stationed in
Richfield, Utah.

The parties purchased a home in Central, Utah,

and a farm in Central, Utah, in 1976•
payment of the farm is unclear*

The source of the down

Mr. Marchant withdrew monies

from his retirement (Transcript, lines 15-19, p. 99). Mrs.
Marchant received a settlement from an automobile accident in the
amount of $15,000.00, which apparently was applied to the down
payment as well as mutual debts and a loan to her brother
(Transcript, lines 1-10, p. 100).
The Marchants were unable to have children and adopted
Brandon in April, 1974, at age 2 months and Sara shortly after
her birth on April 22, 1977.

The parties resided in Central,

Utah, until the marital split in March, 1985.

During the

marriage, both were active in the LDS Church, with Donald
Marchant serving in two Bishoprics and Karen Marchant serving in
the Relief Society Presidency.
Karen Marchant began work for Intermountain Health Care
in Richfield, Utah, in 1982 (Transcript, lines 4-8, p. 31).
Prior to that time, she had worked briefly at the start of the
marriage.

Prior to 1982, Karen and her husband had discussed her

going to work part-time on several occasions.
work to help with the debt on the farm.

She returned to

She was also concerned

that she have a viable skill to earn money for her and her
children in the event of Donald's death (Transcript, lines 10-19,
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p. 31). After 1983, Kay Bowden and David Brown, both of whom
were friends of the Marchants and belonged to the same ward/
testified that Mrs* Marchant1s work interfered with her church
attendance and her goals apparently became more career oriented
since she spent less time with her family and with them at church
and social functions (Transcript/ lines 20-25/ p. 120; lines
1-21/ p* 121; lines 4-20/ p. 124).
Mrs. Bowden was employed as a teacher's aid at the local
elementary school (Transcript/ lines 4-5/ p. 115). She testified
that during the time Donald and Karen were having marital
problems/ she confronted Karen in her home after a return from a
business trip.

Mrs. Bowden states that Karen's appearance had

changed and that "everything was for Karen.

We were no longer in

her field." (Transcript/ lines 9-11/ p. 116). She further
stated that Karen told her she would not work for peanuts like
Mrs. Bowden was and that "when I leave my homef I leave my homemade cookies and homemade bread."

(Transcript/ lines 15-16/

p. 116). Mrs. Bowdenf in concluding her testimony/ stated "I
just don't think Karen has been fair to us.
been faithful to us as a friend?
really concerned about."

How long has she

And that's what I feel I'm

(Transcript/ lines 13-15/ p. 118).

In response to allegations that her career takes precedence over her family, Mrs. Marchant testified "My career aspirations were to be a wife and a mother.
grateful I enjoy my work.

And a job is nice and I am

But I certainly wouldn't term myself a
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career girl or woman, or whatever•
work."

I'm grateful I enjoy my

(Transcript, lines 12-16, p. 60)•
In March, 1985, Mr. Marchant vacated the parties1 home

in Central, Utah, at the request of Mrs. Marchant (Transcript,
lines 10-17, p. 76). During this period, the parties received
marriage counseling from Dr. Richard Kirkham (Transcript, lines
5-9, p. 29). Finally, in August, 1985, Karen filed the Petition
for Divorce and in September, 1985, pursuant to Stipulation
attached hereto as Exhibit "A", moved to Salt Lake City, Utah
with the parties1 two children.
A.

Facts Supporting Divorce Petition:

Mrs. Marchant testified that she and her husband were
sexually and financially incompatible (Transcript, lines 8-17,
p. 27). Additionally, in April, 1985, the Marchants engaged in
an angry argument which resulted in Donald Marchant striking his
wife and knocking her unconscious (Transcript, pp. 102 and 109).
She testified that the turning point in her marriage was when her
husband forced her to have sexual relations the night she
returned from the hospital after a complicated operation and she
was very ill (Transcript, lines 23-25, p. 63; lines 1-5, p. 64).
Mrs. Marchant also stated she did not feel good about the kind of
control Mr. Marchant tried to exercise in the kinds of clothing
she wore and was critical of her (Transcript, lines 7-18, p. 54).
Her husband objected to her sunbathing and going to hot tubs
"things she'd never gone to before in our marriage" (Transcript,
lines 18-21, p. 74; lines 1-5, p. 75).
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Mr. Marchant did not want a divorce and desired reconciliation (Transcript# lines 1-7, p. 21).
B.

Facts Relating to Custody:
1.

Conditions in Salt Lake City.

Mrs. Marchant

had been the primary caretaker of Brandon and Sara during the
marriage; she continued in this capacity despite her working full
time both in Central, Utah, and Salt Lake (Defendant's Exhibit 9,
"Recommendations", p. 3).
Mrs. Marchant maintained sole custody and control of the
children from March, 1985, to June 18, 1986, the date of the
trial.

In September, 1985, when Mrs. Marchant moved to Salt Lake

City, her husband agreed that she take the children with her to
reside in Salt Lake (Stipulation-Order, Exhibit "A" herein).
During that period, Mr. Marchant exercised visitation every other
weekend by taking the children back to Central, Utah, from Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Sara and Brandon both adjusted well to living in Salt
Lake and performed well in school and established friends
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Evaluation of Brandon Marchant";
"Evaluation of Sara Marchant").

Their scores on report cards

indicate they maintained or improved grades at William Penn
Elementary School (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2; Transcript,
pp. 33-34).
While in Salt Lake, Mrs. Marchant took the children to
ballet, concerts, theatre, movies, and hiking; she took skiing
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lessons with Brandon on the weekends (Transcript, p. 35).
Brandon had several friends; and Sara enjoyed friendships with
several children (Transcript, p. 39).
Elizabeth Stewart, the custody evaluator, stated with
respect to the living situation in Salt Lake City, a clear preference for maintaining the status quo:
Situational factors:
1.
Maintaining a satisfactory custody
arrangement when the children are happy and well
adjusted. There is a preference for leaving a
custody arrangement in place where it is clear that
they have made a reasonably good adjustment, and
there is no reason to think that they are not doing
well or that a different custody arrangement would
be clearly better for them. In this respect, both
the Marchant children have adjusted well although it
is quite clear in observing them with their father
that they miss him a great deal. It also seems
likely that Sara's depression and feelings of loneliness are related to her father's absence.
However, if she were living with her father she
may well feel as sad and lonely because of her
mother's absence.
2.
The least disruptive placement. Since
the children are doing well in their mother's
custody at the present time the least disruptive
placement would be to leave them in her custody.
3.
Primary caretaker. Although Mrs.
Marchant has worked full time in recent years, she
has been the primary caretaker. Mr. Marchant,
however, has provided direct care also although the
division of parental responsibility has been quite
traditional in this family. Mrs. Marchant could
adapt to being the primary caretaker.
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendation, p. 3)
Donald Marchant did not like the idea of his children
being raised in Salt Lake,

-11-

"Q. Why do you think the chiLdren would be
better off being raised in Central as opposed to
Salt Lake?
A, I think there is more responsibility for
them there. I do not like the city environment for
children. I don't like the household environment
they're in right now. . . . "
(Transcript, lines 13-19, p. 89)
Also, Mr. Marchant, in cross-examination, was asked
about changes he observed in the children since living in Salt
Lake,

He replied:
"A, I would say more of a worldly approach to
things, a little slick sophistication. It's hard
to define. It's they're exposed to a different
kind of people in Salt Lake. Brandon has attended
several parties. He has been invited to go to the
movies with girls and things in Salt Lake and it's
a different lifestyle."
(Transcript, lines 7-12, p. 106)
Donald Marchant testified his wife had not tried to turn

the children against him while in Salt Lake (Transcript, p. 87).
Don's activities on every other weekend with the children were
fishing, hunting, swimming, bowling, boy scout trips, horseback
riding and rodeos (Transcript/ p. 88).
2.

Living conditions in the duplex.

When Mrs.

Marchant moved to Salt Lake, her sister, Helen, who is divorced
and has a son, moved in with them in November or December, 1985;
each person had their own bedroom (Transcript, lines 7-19,
p. 45).
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Much has been made of Karen living with Helen, "a divorced
woman" so the testimony offered regarding Helen and the apartment
is particularly relevant in light of Finding of Fact 5.C.

In

opening remarks, the Defendant's counsel stated that Mr. Marchant
was concerned with the living situation in Salt Lake in that Mrs.
Marchant was living with her sister, whom Mr. Marchant believed
had "moral problems" (Transcript/ lines 4-8, p. 25). Mr.
Marchant1s entire testimony regarding Helen is as follows:
"A. Allusion was made to Helen and her presence in the home. I don't dislike Helen as a person. I'd like to put that on the record. But I do
object to her being the mother of my children.
Q. Why do you think she's a mother to your
children?
A. She's home more than Karen and she does
a lot of mothering as far as I can tell.
Q. Do you think she is a good or a bad
influence on the children?
A.

I would have to say bad.

Q.

Why do you say that?

A. Because her moral values do not coincide
with what I think is right."
(Transcript, lines 18-25, p. 89; lines 1-5, p. 90)
Mrs. Marchant's testimony was that her sister, Helen,
had a boyfriend, Chuck Moore, who came to the home but never
stayed overnight (Transcript, lines 6-14, p. 46); that Helen
occasionally brings alcohol into the duplex but that she has
discussed Helen's drinking with the children and "they know my
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standards and their own."

(Transcript, lines 8-21, p. 47). She

also stated that she did not agree with Helen's past relationships with men but that had changed (Transcript, lines 14-24,
p. 49).
Karen's work schedule was leaving home at 7:30 a.m. and
returning from work at 5:00 p.m. (Transcript, lines 12-21,
p. 55). When she worked through her lunch, she would arrive home
at 4:00 p.m.

The children left for school at 9:00 a.m. and

returned at 4:00 p.m. and were cared for by Helen while Karen was
absent (Transcript, lines 1-22, p. 56). When Karen went out late
at night, Sara and Brandon were cared for by a twin sister,
Kathy, who lived close to the duplex.

Kathy had children

approximately the same age as Sara and Brandon (Transcript, lines
1-9, p. 57).
In addition to Karen's two sisters and their children
living in Salt Lake, Karen's mother also resided in Salt Lake;
additionally, Donald Marchant's parents and Karen Marchant's
other brother and sister lived in Peoa, Utah (Transcript, lines
1-10, p. 62),
C.

Facts relating to "involvement with another man**

A significant dispute between Donald and Karen Marchant
existed over Karen's friendship with her boss, Doug Fonnesbeck,
in Richfield, Utah.

Conflicting testimony was offered regarding

the extent of their relationship.

Mrs. Marchant was unequivocal

that nothing beyond a friendship existed and Mr. Marchant

insisted Karen was in love with him.

However, it was clear that

nothing of a sexual nature ever occurred.

Doug Fonnesbeck was

Karen's immediate supervisor at Intermountain Health Care in
Richfield, Utah; she first met him when she went to work in 1982
(Transcript, lines 20-21, p. 50).
Donald Marchant tied the trouble in his marriage to Doug
Fonnesbeck.

He believed his marriage was in trouble when his

wife stated what a wonderful man her boss was and that people in
town were talking about her and her boss (Transcript, lines
16-23, p. 72). Mr. Marchant testified that he asked her about
the relationship, and she reportedly stated that there was a
"sexual attraction" (Transcript, lines 1-3, p. 73). In contrast,
when asked about the relationship on cross-examination, Karen
Marchant states:
"Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Marchant when
he asked you what the relationship was that you
might be in love, but it didn't matter because you
could handle it?"
A. No. I didn't say that. I said that
there was a possibility that I could sometime, if
my situation were different, have liked Mr.
Fonnesbeck because I find him an interesting person. But that was the extent of it* There was no
inclination on my part to have a relationship with
Mr. Fonnesbeck in any way. I was married and committed to my marriage."
(Transcript, lines 9-18, p. 52)
The "relationship" between Karen Marchant and her boss
was based upon evidence introduced at trial regarding items which
Mr, Marchant believed were gifts from Doug Fonnesbeck.
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Mr,

Marchant discovered flowers on Karen's desk one day and Karen
told him they were from her boss; he also discovered flowers in
her hospital room (Transcript/ lines 7-18, p. 73). On crossexamination/ Mr. Marchant testified he couldn't tell whether the
flowers were for National Secretary's Day (Transcript/ lines 1-8/
p. 97). Mrs. Marchant stated that the flowers in her hospital
room were from the office/ generally/ and not Mr. Fonnesbeck
(Transcript/ lines 3-5/ p. 51). The gifts consisted of a large
phony diamond ring which Mr. Fonnesbeck gave Karen Marchant as a
joke at a Christmas party in the Marchant's home when Mr.
Marchant and all the staff were present (Transcript/ lines 7-23,
p. 32). Howeverf the ring made Donald Marchant angry when Mrs.
Marchant wore it (Transcript/ lines 8-14, p. 74). Mr. Fonnesbeck
also brought her some candy and "trinkets" which Mr. Marchant saw
on Karen's desk; on occasion/ Mrs. Marchant brought the candy
home and stated to Mr. Marchant they were a gift from Mr.
Fonnesbeck (Transcript/ p. 73).
Karen Marchant gave everyone at her office Valentine's
Day cards as well as cards on other occasions; she states she
indicated on Mr. Fonnesbeck's card appreciation for their
friendship (Transcript/ lines 6-16, p. 51). Donald Marchant
recalled that he looked at the Valentine in February/ 1984, and
saw expressions of affection (Transcript/ pp. 94-95); howeverf on
cross-examination/ he admitted that he had no notes from the card
and that he only recalled the signature from memory (Transcript/
lines 1-12, p. 96).

Sometime prior to their separation, Karen Marchant met
Doug Fonnesbeck at a motel suite at Little America in Salt Lake;
Mr. Fonnesbeck was moving to Logan and was in Salt Lake on business and Karen Marchant was in Salt Lake having a medical checkup after having had a hysterectomy (Transcript, lines 9-21,
p. 53). They met for approximately one and one-half hours and
discussed the effect of Mr. Fonnesbeck moving to Logan on Karen
Marchant's employment in Richfield (Transcript, lines 14-25,
p. 32; lines 1-5, p. 33). She further stated that she had never
been unfaithful to her husband (Transcript/ lines 6-7, p. 33).
Mrs. Marchant disclosed the meeting at Little America to Mr.
Marchant.

Mr. Marchant states that at the time of disclosure,

Mrs. Marchant said she and Mr. Fonnesbeck had no physical relationship but they had expressed love for one another (Transcript,
lines 1-9, p. 76).
Additionally, Karen Marchant went on a trip with the
Fonnesbeck1s entire family to Lake Powell (Transcript, lines
20-24, p. 54).
In summary, no romantic relationship was shown to have
existed, and at most, a trusting friendship*
D.

Psychological Evaluation.

Elizabeth Stewart performed the custodial evaluation on
Mr. and Mrs. Marchant, Brandon and Sara.

Mr. and Mrs. Marchant

are rated as equal in their caretaking ability and the children
have expressed no preference for either parent.
bonding exist-

Equal degrees of

The custody evaluator concludes as follows:
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"The custody decision will clearly have to be
made in view of other factors which are not covered
by the custody evaluation. Both parents truly have
the best interests of their children at heart and
the children clearly need continuing the relationships with both parents."
(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendations", p. 4)
E.

Financial Status of Parties.

Karen Marchant earned $1,750.00 gross and $1,321.00 net
per month from her employment at the time of the divorce
(Transcript, lines 17-21, p. 10). Donald Marchant earned
$2,908.00 gross and $2,114.00 per month net from his employment
with the United States Forest Service (Transcript, lines 1-12,
p. 11).
The division of the marital assets is set forth at pages
4-5 herein.

The Court, except for the pension plan, divided the

assets equally between the parties and required payment to Mrs.
Marchant of her equity of $40,250.00 from the sale of the farm
(Decree, para. 6.D., p. 45, Record).
The expenses of each party was submitted at trial in the
form of exhibits based upon the cost of living when Karen had
custody of the children and Donald had visitation rights. To the
extent that the shift in custody altered expenses, the exhibits
are inaccurate.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (attachhed hereto as

Exhibit "D") shows Karen Marchant expenses as $2,220.00; however,
at trial, Karen Marchant testified that medical and dental bills
were to be paid 100% by her employment and, therefore, the net
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expenses should be reduced by $125.00 (Transcript, lines 18-21,
p. 40). Her sister, Helen, paid two-fifths of the $550.00 rent,
two-fifths of the $135.00 utility bill and one-half of the $40.00
telephone bill, reducing her overall expenses by $294.00
(Transcript, lines 14-25, p. 48; lines 1-10, p. 49). Her
expenses after these deductions were $1,801.00.
Donald Marchantfs expenses, with child support and
travel to pick up the kids, equalled $2,370.00 (Defendant's
Exhibit 10, attached hereto as Exhibit "E").

The child support

monthly payment was $400.00 and travel expenses to exercise visitation was $300.00, which probably should be reduced from Mr.
Marchant1s total expense sheet.

Donald Marchant testified his

trailer was on consignment in Salt Lake for sale and would additionally reduce his monthly expenses by $165.00 (Transcript,
lines 23-25, p. 76).
Donald Marchant testified Mrs. Marchant had received two
personal injury settlements totaling $20,000; the $15,000 settlement was used to pay the farm, pay marital debts and make a loan
to Karen's brother (Transcript, lines 23-25, p. 99; lines 1-10,
p. 100).
Mr. Marchant was required to pay debts incurred during
the marriage which were as follows:
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Description

Amount

Balance Due

Truck

320.00

11,000.00

Visa

65.00

1,200.00

Master Charge

65.00

1,300.00

Loan, M. A, Marchant

14,000.00

Farm Loan, Zions Bank

2,000.00

Personal Loan

50.00

1,300.00

Mr. Marchant testified that the $14,000.00 loan was from
his father and that he did not sign a Promissory Note, but it was
due "when he could get it" (Transcript, lines 6-15, p. 104). The
other payments on marital obligations were already included in
his monthly expenses. Therefore, he had no additional debt
increase as a result of the Decree.
Mr. Marchant testified that his pension plan was valued
at $18,000.00 and was currently vested at the time of trial
(Transcript, lines 17-25, p. 66; lines 1-12, p. 67).
Regarding alimony, Karen Marchant stated that she
desires to return to school and complete her education and that
schooling cost approximately $135.00 per semester hour; she estimated she would need $200.00 per month as alimony (Transcript/
p. 43).
F.

Courts Findings and Rulings.

Judge Tibbs "Findings and Rulings'" from the Transcript
are attached hereto as Exhibit "F". His statements and rulings
reflect significant bias against divorcing women generally and
Mrs. Marchant specifically.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The remarks, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by
Judge Donald V. Tibbs show bias towards divorcing women generally
and Karen Marchant specifically.
1.

THE FACTORS SET FORTH BY THE TRIAL COURT IN

DETERMININING THE "BEST INTERESTS" OF THE CHILDREN IN THE CUSTODY
AWARD SHOW THE COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW LEGAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED
IN UTAH FOR CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS, DO NOT SET FORTH A RATIONAL
OR LOGICAL BASIS FOR MAKING THE AWARD TO MR. MARCHANT AND
TERMINATING LONG TIME TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF MRS. MARCHANT, AND DO
NOT REFLECT THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE "BEST
INTERESTS" OF THE CHILDREN WERE BETTER SERVED BY MAINTAINING MRS.
MARCHANT AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT.
2.

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT MRS. MARCHANT MET THE

LEGAL STANDARD FOR BEING AWARDED ALIMONY IN THAT HER INCOME WAS
LESS THAN HER EXPENSES, DONALD MARCHANT'S EARNING POWER AND
INCOME GREATLY EXCEEDED KAREN MARCHANT'S, MRS. MARCHANT DESIRED
TO RETURN TO SCHOOL AND THE PARTIES HAD BEEN MARRIED 18 YEARS
DURING WHICH TIME MRS. MARCHANT REMAINED IN THE HOME AS A
HOUSEWIFE.
3.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER, IN

DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS, ALL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE
COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE; THE COURT GAVE NO CONSIDERATION OR CREDIT
TO MRS. MARCHANT FOR PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS OF $20,000.00 WHICH
WERE CONTRIBUTED TO THE MARRIAGE.
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4.

THE COURT'S AWARD OF 100% OF THE RETIREMENT PLAN TO

MR. MARCHANT AND ONE-THIRD THAT AMOUNT TO MRS. MARCHANT WAS
INEQUITABLE IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
MARRIAGE, AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD ALIMONY, ATTORNEY'S
FEES OR CREDIT MRS. MARCHANT FOR PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Karen Marchant decided, after years of an unhappy
marriage, that she should get a divorce.

The decision came after

sexual incompatibility, financial incompatibility and constant
jealous rage and anger by her husband.

For this decision, Judge

John Tibbs deprived her of the custody of her children, Sara and
Brandon.

As further penalties, he refused to award her alimony

after an 18 year marriage or attorney's fees, despite her earning
a little more than 60% of her husband's income during her relatively recent employment.
Judge Tibbs' punitive attitude towards Mrs. Marchant is
apparent in his remarks at the conclusion of the trial and his
Findings of Fact regarding the custody issue.

In his closing

remarks, Judge Tibbs rails over the young criminals who are the
product of a broken home, asserting that every criminal who comes
before him for sentencing has divorced parents.

Further, Judge

Tibbs states:
"I'll be honest. I have difficulty with what
the Plaintiff (Karen Marchant) sues. Alleges
grounds. I have difficulty finding that this
Defendant's done anything wrong, other than
slapping her. Maybe that was justified. I don't
believe in it. I don't believe anyone should use
-22-

force and violence. But I am having difficulty.
(Transcript, p. 130)
This "difficulty" exists despite Mrs. Marchant1s testimony and Mr. Marchant*s testimony of sexual incompatibility/ that
they had not engaged in sexual relations for more than two years
prior to the divorce, had one year of marital counseling prior to
the divorcef and that Mr. Marchant had forced her to have sex
with him the night she returned home from the hospital after an
operation for infertility and she was extremely ill.

Further,

Karen Marchant testified that her husband was constantly jealous
and that in a fit of anger he had hit and knocked her
unconscious.

No doubt Mr. Marchant is a good fellow but saying

that there is no basis for the divorce goes to the point of highlighting an apparent bias against divorcing women generally.
That bias is explicit in the Findings of Fact where the
Judge states that a basis for awarding custody of the children to
Mr. Marchant is that Mrs. Marchant moved into an apartment and
"her sister, another woman who is divorced, moved in with her,
together with her minor child."

(Transcript, p. 135).

Although the appealable errors are based generally upon
misapplication of law to facts, the various rulings are made
increasingly questionable by Judge Tibbs1 attitude towards Mrs.
Marchant as evidenced by his statements and the shallowness of
the basis of his decision on the custody issue.

It is apparent

his decision is solely against Mrs. Marchant on that point and
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not in favor of the "best interests" of the Brandon and Sara
Marchant.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO DONALD MARCHANT
Judge Tibbs abused his discretion in awarding the
parties1 minor children to Donald Marchant.

The evidence

strongly shows the Judge should have maintained the existing
custodial award rather than changing its prior Orders. Although
a Trial Court Judge is granted broad discretion in making custody
determination Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah, 1975), a Court
must apply legal standard to the decision making process which
rationally relate to the ultimate conclusions in the custody
process-

Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah, 1986).

It is

particularly because of this broad discretion that Trial Court
Judges must carefully weigh a variety of facts and look to
established legal guidelines in arriving at proper conclusions.
In the instant case, the Trial Court totally failed in its
charge.
A.

Legal Standards in Custody Determination.

A Trial Court must make custody awards based upon the
"best interests" of the children.
Ann. (1977, as amended).

Section 30-3-10, Utah Code

A child custody proceeding is equitable

in nature and must be based primarily and foremost on the
"welfare and interest of the minor children".
614 P,2d 641, 645 (Utah, 1980).
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Kallas v. Kallas,

On numerous occasions, this Court has set forth factors
which should be considered in arriving at conclusions regarding
the "best interests" of the children*

In Hutchinson v.

Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1982), this Court stated:
"Some factors the Court may consider in determining the child's best interests relate primarily
to the child's feelings or special needs: the preference of the child; keeping siblings together;
the relative strength of the child's bond with one
or both of the prospective custodians; and, in
appropriate cases, the general interests in continuing previously determined custody arrangements
where the child is happy and well adjusted.
(Citations omitted)
i
Other factors relate primarily to the prospective
custodians' character or status or to their capacity or willingness to function as parents; moral
character and emotional stability; duration and
depth of desire for custody; ability to provide
personal rather than surrogate care; significant
impairment of ability to function as a parent
through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in
the past; religious compatibility with the child;
kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances,
stepparent status; and financial condition."
(Citations omitted) At p.41.
i
This Court has, on occasion, highlighted factors which
are most importantly considered in custody determinations.
"We believe that the choice in competing child
custody claims should instead be based on functionrelated factors. Prominent among these, though not
exclusive, is the identity of the primary caretaker
during the marriage. Other factors should include
the identity of the parent with greater flexibility
to provide personal care for the child and the
identify of the parent with whom the child has
spent most of his or her time pending custody
determination if that period has been lengthy.
Another important factor should be the stability of
the environment provided by each parent."
Citing Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child
Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18
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Fam.L.Q.I (Spring, 1984).
117# 120 (Utah, 1986).

Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d

Assessment of the applicability and relative weight of
these various factors in a particular case lie within the sound
discretion of the Trial Court.

Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra

at 41. However, a Court may not arbitrarily substitute factors
which are not functionally related to the "best interests of the
child".

Smith v. Smith, supra.
B.

Judge Tibbs Misapplied the Law in Making the

Custody Determination.
The Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court show the
complete misapplication of law in this case.

The Findings show

no sufficient basis whatsoever for terminating Karen's temporary
custody which existed for 15 months prior to the divorce and
awarding permanent custody to her husband.

This Court has

recently held that Findings of Fact must demonstrate a rational
factual basis for the ultimate decision of custody award by
references to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests
of the child, including specific attributes of the parents.
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah, 1986).
The Findings of Fact in this case are not logical, do
not relate to the best interests of the children, show bias and
prejudice on the part of the Trial Court Judge and, in some
instances, are not supported by the evidence in the record.
1.

Finding of Fact 5.A,

"That both the Plaintiff

and Defendant are good parents, and that both parties could be
awarded custody of the minor children."
-76-

The Trial Court here recognizes the equality of the
parties as confirmed in the Elizabeth Stewart custody evaluations
wherein she makes no preference by way of recommendation for
custody in either party.

However, the Trial Court makes no

further reference to important factors examined by the custody
evaluatorf especially the preference for maintaining the status
quo with Karen Marchant as the custodial parent and the fact that
the least disruptive placement would be maintaining custody with
Mrs. Marchant.

(Defendant's Exhibit 9f "Recommendations" p. 3 ) .
2*

Finding of Fact 5.B.

"That the marriage

entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the
actions on the part of the Plaintiff/ which were not justified."
This Finding of Fact flies directly in the face of
granting Plaintiff the divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and
is not supported by the record.

To the contrary/ Karen Marchant

testified of unhappiness in her marriage which she believed began
at the time when her husband/ Donald Marchant/ forced her to have
sexual relations the night she arrived home from the hospital
after an operation for infertility when she was feeling very ill.
She further testified of years of sexual incompatibility/ of her
husband's jealousy and anger of her outside relationships and
activities and of other emotional incompatibility.

Additionally/

both Mr. and Mrs. Marchant testified of the incident when Mr.
Marchant angrily struck Mrs. Marchant/ knocking her unconscious.
Finally/ the Finding of Fact does not relate in any
respect to the best interests of the children.
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It rather

reflects a punitive view of the Trial Court that Donald Marchant
is a deserving man and Karen Marchant1s extreme difficulty during
the course of the marriage are not worthy of being deemed
"justification" for divorce,
3,

Finding of Fact 5.C.

"That when the Plaintiff

vacated the family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake
City, Utah, in September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and
in approximately November or December of 1985, her sister,
another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together with
her minor child-

That the standard of living under which

Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary custody of
the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it should have
been nor was it in the best interests of the children."
The Judge's bias against a divorcing or divorced
woman is underscored by his making reference to Mrs. Marchant
living with "another woman who is divorced".

There is no other

basis why this is a salient factor for his consideration in
custody determination.

The testimony regarding Karen Marchant1s

sister, Helen, provided no basis upon which the Court could find
that this "divorced woman" should be a significant factor.
Donald Marchant testified that he did not think Helen would be a
good influence on his children "because her moral values don't
coincide with what I think is right".
90).

(Transcript, line 4-5, p.

No other evidence was offered which plausibly could

discredit Karen's sister.
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The finding that "the standard of living . . . is
not what it should have been nor was it in the best interests of
the children" is not supported by the record and is vague.

Karen

Marchant testified that each of the parties lived in separate
bedrooms, that her social life revolved around taking the
children to concertsf theatre# movies, skiing and other activities.

Elizabeth Stewart's psychological evaluations of Brandon

Marchant and Sara Marchant indicate both are reasonably well
adjusted in the environment and there is nothing adverse about
the living conditions, except the absence of their father
(Defendant's Exhibit 9 ) . Karen Marchant's absence from the
duplex in Salt Lake was work-related and she is home each day
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. and her sister provides the care
during her absence when the children are not in school.

Donald

Marchant testified that he was not aware of any time during the
period they were in Salt Lake City when Sara and Brandon did not
have food, shelter and clothing or were not adequately cared for.
(Transcript, lines 1-8, p. 107)
In short, this unsupported and vague Finding of
Fact does not provide a rational basis upon which the Court made
its custody determination.
4.

Finding of Fact 5.D.

"That during the latter

part of the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff
became involved with another man and this had an influence with
the Court in determining what is the best interests of the minor
children."
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Karen Marchant1s "involvement" with Doug Fonnesbeck
was shown to be no more than on a friendship level. Mrs.
Marchant testified that she liked her boss as a friend, found him
interesting and trusted him.

She testified that there was no

romantic or sexual involvement.

No evidence was introduced to

the contraryf although Mr. Marchant stated that he had seen
flowers, a couple of other gifts like candy and the famous ring
incident where Fonnesbeck gave Mrs. Marchant a phony diamond at a
Christmas party with Intermountain Health Care staff in the
Marchant1s home.

Karen Marchant voluntarily brought home candy

and disclosed that it was from her boss and also voluntarily
disclosed her meeting in Salt Lake with Doug Fonnesbeck.

These

voluntary disclosures are contrary to any significant sexual or
romantic involvement.

However, beyond that/ the Utah Supreme

Court has held that even in the most extreme instances of
flagrant sexual involvement, in order to be considered as a
factor in custody determinations/ the relationship must be shown
to be adverse to the best interests of the children.

Shioji v.

Shioji/ 671 P.2d 135 (Otah# 1983); Kallas v. Kallasf 614 P.2d 641
(Utah/ 1980).
The declaration that her "involvement with another
man" influenced the Court is patent affirmation of the Court
ignoring traditional factors of either parents1 positive or negative attributes/ caretaking abilities/ or environmental conditions which may play a role in appropriate child rearing
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process.

The Court's findings essentially negate the possibility

of a woman having any friendship relationship with a man who is
not her husband at the risk of losing her children in a child
custody battle.

Further, it may have been the case that the

relationship could have been a very positive factor with respect
to the best interests of the children but no further finding is
evident on that point.
5*

Finding of Fact 5.E.

"That during the latter

years of the marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that
change was not in the best interests of the family unit, but
rather the change was pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her
benefit to the exclusion of the family unit."
It is accurate that Karen Marchant decided, after
some years of an unhappy marriage, that she no longer wanted to
be married to Donald Marchant which certainly does not promote
"the best interests of the family unit".

However, Mrs. Marchant

again is being penalized for exercising her right to obtain a
divorce rather than this being a factor which relates to either
her or Donald Marchant*s ability to care for and raise Sara and
Brandon Marchant.

The only "lifestyle" change in the latter

years of the marriage was that in 1982, Karen Marchant decided to
go to work.

Her testimony on that point was that she felt a

clear economic need to reduce the indebtedness which had been
incurred with the purchase of the farm and that as a result of
her experience as a child when her father died leaving her mother
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with eight children to rearf she felt a clear need to have a
vocation upon which to rely in the event of her husband1s death.
She continued as the primary caretaker of Sara and Brandon
Marchant while working.

The record is void of any characteristic

of her lifestyle which would adversely effect the best interests
of the children, such as drug or alcohol abuse, illicit relationships with men in the presence of the children, adverse
psychological traits, or other negative "lifestyle" factors.

Her

behavior is simply consistent with a person who had made the
decision to obtain a divorce which should not preponderate
against her on a child custody issue.
In conclusion, the Trial Court wholly failed to
provide a "rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests
of the child11.

Smith v. Smith, supra, at 426.

The Court

employed none of the factors outlined in Hutchinson, supra, in
making the award.
C.

The Court Should Have Awarded the Parties1 Children

to Karen Marchant*
Under Pusey v. Pusey, supra, and Hutchinson v.
Hutchinson, supra, the factors therein dictate that the Trial
Court should have awarded custody of Brandon and Sara Marchant to
Karen Marchant.

Under Pusey, "prominent11 considerations relate

to the primary caretaker during marriage and the person with whom
the children have spent their time during the determination of

custody.

Karen Marchant, up until her employment of 1982, had

been almost the sole caretaker of the children while she was at
home as a housewife and her husband worked.
tinued as the primary caretaker.

After 1982, she con-

(Defendant's Exhibit 9,

"Recommendations", para. 3 ) . Donald Marchant moved out of the
parties1 home in Central, Utah, in March, 1985, and from March,
1985, to September, 1985, Karen Marchant was the primary caretaker in Central, Utah.

From September, 1985, to June, 1986,

Karen Marchant maintained custody in Salt Lake City, Utah.
These factors become increasingly more prominent where
the custody evaluator has not recommended custody in either
party.

In fact, the change in custody from Mrs. Marchant to Mr.

Marchant becomes more puzzling in light of the custody evaluator
indicating that "there is a preference for leaving the custody
arrangement in place where it is clear that they have made a
reasonably good adjustment and there is no reason to think that
they are not doing well or that a different custody arrangement
would be better for them."

Further, the evaluator states "since

the children are doing well in their mother's custody at the present time the least disruptive placement would be to leave them
in her custody."

(Defendant's Exhibit 9, "Recommendations"

p. 3 ) .
There is simply no evidence in the record which pointed
to disturing the custody arrangement after the children had
attended one full year at William Penn Elementary School in Salt
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Lake City, Utah, had become well adjusted to the Salt Lake City
condition and environment, had gained friends. This is especially true in light of the childrens1 familial ties through
Karen Marchant's mother, two sisters and their families living in
Salt Lake, and Don Marchant's and Karen Marchant's brother and
sister and parents living in Peoa, Utah, which is nearby.

In

fact, during working hours, Mrs. Marchant had a preferable caretaker in her sister, Helen, who was a close relative and could
provide care and nurturing on a familial basis. That evidence is
opposed to Donald Marchant's testimony who stated that on a
theoretical basis he would obtain some "good ladies" from the
neighborhood to care for the children while he was at work and
they had returned home from school, or in the alternative, during
summer months when he was at work (Transcript, lines 1-12,
p. 91). He could only make statements on an assumed basis and
could provide no practical experience.
On a variety of other factors, the best interests of the
children would have been equally well served by awarding custody
to either party in that no strong preponderance occurred from
character traits, caretaking abilities, child preference or emotional stability.

The factors set forth by the Court as weighing

importantly in its custody determination were strongly outweighed
by the factors discussed in Pusey v. Pusey, supra.
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D.

The Court Abused its Discretion in Custody

Determination.
Based upon the Court's apparent prejudice/ its lack of
consideration or explication of appropriate factors/ its failure
to apply the law, and the positive factors which preponderate in
favor of Karen Marchant having continued custody of Sara and
Brandon Marchant, it is apparent that the Court abused its
discretion.

As the Court has traditionally held and recently

stated:
"This Court will not overturn a Trial Court's
custody determination on appeal unless the evidence
clearly shows that the custody determination was
not in the best interests of the child or that the
Trial Court misapplied applicable principles of
law." (Citation omitted) Smith v. Smith, at 425.
This case is one of those clear instances when the Court abused
its discretion and should be reversed.
II.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ALIMONY
The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to
award Karen Marchant alimony in that she clearly met the traditional legal standard required for an award of alimony.

The

Court entered no Findings of Fact on the point other than Mrs.
Marchant is not entitled to alimony.

The evidence supports that

after an 18 year marriage to the Defendant, alimony should have
been awarded.
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A.

Applicable Standard for Alimony Determination,

This Court, on numerous occasions, has held that the
most important function of alimony is to support for wife as
nearly as possible to the standard of living she enjoyed during
the marriage,

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah, 1985);

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah, 1983); English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah, 1977),
With this purpose in mind, the Trial Court must consider
three factors in making a reasonable alimony award:
1.

The financial conditions and needs of the

2.

The ability of the wife to produce a suf-

wife;

ficient income for herself; and
3.

The ability of the husband to provide support,

Jones v. Jones, supra, at 1075; English v. English, supra, at
411-12; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah, 1980);
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P,2d 144, 147 (Utah, 1978),
B.

The Facts Warrant Awarding Alimony to Karen

Marchant,
The living conditions of the Marchants prior to the
marital breakup, the economic earning powers of the parties and
their relative needs strongly show that the Court should have
awarded alimony.

Don and Karen Marchant were married 18 years at

the time of divorce,

Karen had quit college to support Don while

he obtained his Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering at
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Brigham Young University.

Karen worked only during the first few

years of the marriage and then from 1974 to 1982 cared full time
for the parties1 children.

In 1982 she went to work as a secre-

tary in that she had no other skills upon which she could rely or
significant educational experience by way of a degree.

Don

Marchant testified that his gross annual income was $37,000.00
per year or $2,908.00 gross and $2,114.00 net.

Karen Marchant1s

employment produced approximately $21,000.00 per year gross,
$1,750.00 per month gross and $1,350.00 per month net.

Prior to

the marital breakup, the parties lived in a home in Central,
Utah, which was awarded to Don Marchant.

In light of Don

Marchant1s engineering degree and longevity with the United
States Forest Service, his earning power is significantly greater
than Mrs. Marchant1s.

This Court has held:

"Where a marriage is of long duration and the
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds that
of the other, as here, is appropriate to order alimony and child support at a level which will insure
that the support spouse and children may maintain a
standard of living not unduly disproportionate to
that which they would have enjoyed had the marriage
continued." Savage v. Savage, 685 P.2d 1201, 1205
(Utah, 1983).
Mrs. Marchant testified and submitted her exhibit
showing that her expenses were $1,801.00, which is $470.00
greater than her net income.

(Transcript, lines 17-21, p. 10;

lines 18-21, p. 4; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.)

Reducing her expenses

for the absence of the children by deducting the child care of
$100,00 and school expenses of $80.00, she is still $290.00
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short.

Don Marchant1s expenses are a total $2,370.00; however,

this included a monthly support payment of $400.00 and travel
expenses to exercise visitation of $300.00 which should be
deducted out, leaving expenses of $1,670.00. Also, Mr. Marchant
testified with respect to the $165.00 per month payment on the
trailer, that it was on consignment in Salt Lake and should immediately be sold which would reduce his monthly expenses to
$1,505.00.
Mrs. Marchant testified that she desired to return to
school and gain further education which would cost $135.00 per
semester hour.

She estimated that she would need approximately

$200.00 per month in alimony to obtain that education.
Although Mrs. Marchant was awarded marital assets which
would theoretically produce income upon the sale which was
ordered by June, 1987, division of marital assets is an
inappropriate measure of alimony.

The Court has held:

"The standard utilized by the Trial Court,
i.e. the length of the marriage and contributions
of each to their joint financial success, is not an
appropriate measure to determine alimony. There is
a distinction between the division of assets accumulated during marriage, which should be distributed upon an equitable basis, and the post-marital
duty of support and maintenance."
English v. English, supra, at 411. Also see Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, at 1223 (Utah, 1980).
In light of the disparate earning capacities of Mr. and
Mrs. Marchant, their expenses and needs, his ability to pay and
her current and future needs, it is apparent she unqualifiably
met the requirements for being awarded alimony.
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C.

The Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Award

Alimony*
This Court has stated that it will not disturb an award
of alimony unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion.

Dority v. Pority, 645 P.2d 56, at 59 (Utah, 1982).

However, the Court's failure to observe this Court's standard for
awarding alimony in the instant case is apparent.

In the Court's

Memorandum Decision, and its Findings of Fact, there is no record
of any analysis performed by the Court of the three factors which
warranted granting Mrs. Marchant alimony.

As we have suggested

before, this may, in part, be due to a punitive attitude on the
part of the Trial Court to Mrs. Marchant's move to obtain a
divorce where the Trial Court felt that her actions were not
justified.

However, this Court, while sitting in equity, has the

ability to independently review the record and make its own
conclusions.

Jones v. Jones, supra, at 1075. The Court in

Jones, applying the standard set forth above, held that the Trial
Court abused its discretion in failing to award an appropriate
amount of alimony.

The evidence before the Court clearly shows

that the Trial Court abused its discretion by not granting
reasonable alimony to Karen Marchant.
III.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER PERSONAL INJURY AWARD TO KAREN MARCHANT
IN ITS DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
There is no evidence in the record that Judge Tibbs considered the total of $20,000.00 awarded to Karen Marchant from
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two personal injury accidents. According to Mr- Marchant's
testimony, he was unclear as to the portion of the $15,000.00
award which was contributed by Karen to purchase the farm;
however, he states that a portion went to pay mutual debts,
purchased personal items and some was loaned to Karen's brother
(Transcript, lines 1-10, p. 110). The record reflects that it
was a separate award to Karen Marchant.
A.

Legal Standard in Assessing Division of Marital

Assets.
Interpretation and construction of Section 30-3-5, Utah
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) requires the Trial Court to consider
the entirety of each parties1 assets and how they were acquired
and their use during the course of the marriage.

In Woodward v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1982), the Trial Court awarded the
wife a percentage of the husband's retirement fund.

The husband

appealed contending the pension plan should not be included in
property distribution in that the income was to be received in
the future.

Using an analysis which is particularly appropriate

in the instant case, this Court stated:
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired
during the marriage/ then the Court must at least
consider those benefits in making an equitable
distribution of marital assets." Woodward, at
p. 432.
The Court cited prior case law for the proposition that
all assets brought into the marriage, all assets acquired during
the marriage, from whatever source, must be considered when
making an equitable distribution:
-40-

"In Englart v. Englartf Utah, 576 P.2d 1274
(1978), we emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the family, pointing out that
the Court may take into consideration all of the
pertinent circumstances. The circumstances encompass all of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived . . . .,f Woodward at p. 432.
More recently, in upholding a division of marital property where sixty percent (60%) of the estate was awarded to the
wife and forth percent (40%) to the husband, the Utah Supreme
Court considered it a prominent factor that the wife had used
proceeds from the sale of her home to purchase the parties' original home in Park City, Utah,
(Utah, 1982).

Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931

Accord Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah, 1982).

In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980), the husband
(Defendant) appealed an award splitting the marital estate fiftyfive percent (55%) in favor of his wife and forty-five percent
(45%) to him, claiming abuse of discretion.

Upholding the Trial

Court's award, the Court stated:
"The Trial Court had before it testimony that
Plaintiff had not been gainfully employed outside
the home for nearly 22 years and her skills were in
clerical and sales work. On the other hand, the
Defendant had a well established profession netting
him in excess of $40,000.00 per year. The fact
that, due to her willingness to work while he
attended school, Plaintiff has not increased her
earning capacity to the same extent as had the
Defendant, speaks in favor of the Trial Court's
distribution."
"Furthermore, it was undisputed that Plaintiff
contributed $10,000.00 from her own separate funds
to completely furnish the first home of the parties
and when that home was sold and their current home
was purchased, many of those furnishings were moved
to and are still in the new residence. Plaintiff
-41-

contributed another $5,000.00 of her own funds in
1967 to retire the mortgage on this residence. In
view of these undisputed facts, the Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding a greater portion of the marital property to the Plaintiff than
to the Defendant." Kerr, at 1382-83.
B.

The Personal Injury Awards to Karen Marchant Should

be Considered to Recompute the Division of the Marital Assets.
In each of the cases cited above, the Court upheld division of marital assets which, in some instances, disproportionately favored the party contributing a significant amount of
money or assets to the marital estate.

However, in this case,

the larger portion of the assets were awarded to Donald Marchant.
The Trial Court made no consideration of the personal injury
award to Karen Marchant in its division of the marital assets
which is apparent from its dividing all of the property, except
for the pension plan, fifty percent (50%) to Don Marchant and
fifty percent (50%) to Karen Marchant.

The inequity worked

against Mrs. Marchant is apparent from the property award.
Further, it cannot be claimed that she is being compensated on
another level in that she was not awarded alimony or attorney's
fees.

Therefore, the Court's failure to consider the personal

injury award is a misapplication of the law which results in
substantial prejudice.
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IV.
FAILURE TO AWARD KAREN MARCHANT ONE-HALF OF THE RETIREMENT
BENEFITS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A*

Equity Requires at Least an Equal Distribution of

the Marital Assets.
In distributing marital assets, a variety of equitable
concerns must be considered by the Court such as the fifteen specific factors stated in McDonald v. McDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, at
1070 (Utah, 1951).
its Orders.

The Trial Court has broad discretion entering

In commenting on the Trial Court's discretion, this

Court has stated:
"When a marriage has failed/ a court's duty is
to consider the various factors relating to the
situation and to arrange the best possible allocation of the property and the economic resources of
the parties so that the parties and their children
can pursue their lives in as happy and useful a
manner as possible." Read v. Ready 594 P.2d 871
(Utah, 1979).
In accordance with equitable considerations, Karen
Marchant should have been awarded at least fifty percent (50%) of
Donald Marchant's retirement plan to maintain at least a fiftyfifty split of the marital assets.

During the majority of the

time Donald Marchant worked for the U.S. Forest Service, Karen
was at home raising the children.

Her activities as a housewife

during those several years warrant consideration in his accumulation of retirement benefits.

Further, during the short period of

time she has been employed, she has received no accumulation of
benefits other than social security income.

-43-

Other factors are

that the Court failed to include consideration for the personal
injury awards which were contributed to the marriage, no award of
alimony or attorney's fees.

The Trial Court was in a unique

position to consider the parties, their children, their incomes
and accumulated property.

However, viewing the overall division

of property, it is apparent that the Court strongly favored
Donald Marchant when equitable considerations would dictate
otherwise.
B.

The Court Failed to Consider the Terms of the Civil

Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 for Alternative
Distribution.
Under the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of
1984 (Pub. L. No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3195, 1984, amending 5 U.S.C.
Section 8331, 8339, 8345, 8901 et jseg. ) , the Court could have
provided that Karen Marchant be made an alternative beneficiary
for all benefits due under the Civil Service Retirement Plan.
A Qualified Domestic Relations Order could have been entered
directing the Administrator of the Plan to transfer the
appropriate percentage of funds to the account of Karen Marchant.
Given Karen's lack of retirement benefits and no significant
prospects for accrual of similar benefits, the alternative may
have been significantly preferred.

However, the Court failed to

address the alternative which should have been paramount in
looking to the most beneficial treatment available for each of
the parties.

From the Court's Orders, it is unclear upon what
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basis and under what conditions the determination was made that
Karen should be paid no more than one-third (1/3) of the vested
amount of the retirement plan.

However, consideration of protec-

tion of Mrs. Marchant's rights to pension plan benefits should
have been addressed.
C.

Awarding Eight Percent (8%) Interest was Arbitrary

and an Abuse of Discretion.
The Court awarded Donald Marchant one hundred percent
(100%) of his retirement benefits of $18,000.00 and awarded Karen
Marchant $6,000.00, payable over a ten year period in equal
installments/ accruing interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
In making the award, the Court does not address the percentage
interest on any factual basis or tie it to any relevant requirement.

Utah law requires that judgments bear interest at the rate

of twelve percent (12%) per annum.
Ann. (1981, as amended).

Section 15-1-4, Utah Code

The $6,000.00 award is clearly a

"judgment" within the meaning of the statute and should accrue
interest at twelve percent (12%) as required by the statute.

The

Court's failure to make the award was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
In prosecuting this appeal, we have been mindful of
Karen Marchant's burden to show error and that this Court will
overturn the Trial Court's Findings of Fact only if they are
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence.

On the

issue of custody, the Findings of Fact clearly are not disposi-
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tive of the best interests of the children, underscore a
misapplication of the law and an apparent bias by the Trial Court
Judge and wholly fail to consider prominent bases that this Court
has asserted should be controlling in the instant case.

The

failure to award alimony to Mrs. Marchant where it is clearly
warranted under the standards set forth by this Court and the
inequitable distribution of the parties' property show a pervasive abuse of discretion by the Trial Court Judge which has
resulted in significant injustice.

This Court should reverse the

judgment of the Trial Court as abuses of discretion and enter
judgment in accordance with the controlling cases set forth
herein and the facts in the record.
DATED this y^

day of February, 1987.

-46-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be mailed to Hans Q.
Chamberlain, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, 110 North Main
Street, #6, Cedar City, Utah

84720, this

1987.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Karen Schumann Marchant,
Plaintiff,
STIPULATION FOR
TEMPORARY ORDER and
TEMPORARY ORDER
VB.

Civil No. 9605
Donald J.

Marchant,
Defendant.

The above matter was heard by the Court on August 21,
1985,

at Richfield, Utah.

David L.

Mower.

Chamberlain.

Plaintiff was present, with counsel,

Defendant was present, with

Counsel

counsel, Hans

Q.

recited for the Court a Stipulation, which

is hereby memorialized and reduced to writing:
1. Temporary custody of the parties'

minor

children,

Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena
Marchant, born

April

22, 1977, shall be awarded to plaintiff,

subject to reasonable and liberal visitation rights

reserved

in

defendant.
2.

Temporary

possession

of

the home in Central, RFD

Monroe, Utah, and farm shall be awarded to defendant.

- 1 -

3* There shall be no contact between the parties unless
the same is initiated by plaintiff, save and

except

to

discuss

and arrange for the defendant's exercise of visitation rights and
save and except to discuss financial matters.
4. Neither party shall file any pleading nor do any act
to

advance

this

cause

for

a period of one hundred and twenty

(120) days.
5.
support

Defendant shall pay to

plaintiff

temporary

child

in the amount of TWO HDNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) per month

per child.
6.
Central,

Plaintiff will vacate the family

home

located

in

RFD Honroef Utah, and willf during the next one hundred

and twenty (120) days occupy only rental property.
7.

Neither party shall dipose of

any

marital

assets

without a prior Court order or without mutual consent.
8.

Neither

party

9.

Defendant

shall incur any debt without mutual

consent.

insurance

coverage

shall

maintain

in

presently

existing

for

force

the

medical

the benefit of the

plaintiff and the parties1 minor children. In addition, defendant
will pay any medical expenses not covered by insurance.
10.
except

those

Defendant will assume and pay all
specifically

marital

debts,

assumed by plaintiff, including, but

not limited to, the following:

the monthly house payment in the

amount of FOUR HDNDRED THREE DOLLARS ($403.00), the monthly truck
payment

in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($330.00),

the monthly trailer payment in the amount of
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ONE

HDNDRED

SIXTY

FIVE DOLLARS ($165.00), and the annual farm payment in the amount
of approximately FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00).
11.

Defendant

will

pay to plaintiff the sum of THREE

HDNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($375.00) to be applied towards
debts

to

ZCMI

and

to

Dr.

the

Reed ChriEtensen, which debts will

thereafter be assumed by plaintiff.
12.

Either party may have the children examined

by

a

child psychologist or child psychiatrist.

Executed on

Aug„st 2J_,

1985.

Q & I J ^
David L.

Executed on August

,Mower

., 1985
s Q.

Chamberlain

ORDER
The within and foregoing Stipulation is approved by the
Court and hereby adopted as ItVs Order,

Executed on^u&ist:

^

f

1985.
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EXHIBIT "B"

^^JBSIS
1
2
3
4

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

£-* nrpuTy

5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
6
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
7
8

KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

9
10

vs.

11

DONALD J. MARCHANT,

12

Civil No. 9605

Defendant.

13
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, sitting
14
without a jury, on June 18th, 1986.

At that time, Plaintiff

15
appeared, together with her attorney, David L. Mower.

Defendant

16
likewise appeared, together with his attorney of record, Hans Q.
17
Chamberlain.

More than three months have elapsed since the

18
filing of the Complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff and Defendant
19
were each called to testify concerning said matter, together with
20
other witnesses.

The matter having been submitted to the Court,

21
and the Court having been fully advised in the premises, now
22
makes the following:
23
FINDINGS OF FACT
24
1.

That Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Sevier

25
County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the time
kMBERLAIN
HIGBEE
RMCYt AT LAW
• O U T H MAIM
O K > T«4

XOAK Crrr.

1

2

2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 8th,

3

1967, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and ever since said time have been

4

and now are husband and wife.

5

3.

The Court finds that Defendant has treated the Plaintiff

6

cruelly, both mentally and physically, and that the parties

7

simply cannot continue to maintain the marital relationship.

8

reason of the same, Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce,

9

final and effective upon entry, the Court, for good cause, having

10
11

By

waived the interlocutory period required by law.
4.

Two children were adopted by the parties, namely,

12

Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena

13

Marchant, born April

14

concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court

15

dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with

16

Plaintiff

17

visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from

18

his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City,

19

Utah, picking up the children, returning

20

thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on

21

Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in

22

Central, Utah.

23

5.

22, 1977.

Pursuant

to a Stipulation

in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been

to his home, and

In determining what is in the best interests of the

24

children for purposes of determining custody, the Court makes the

25

following specific findings:

MBERLAIN
HIGBEE
IMCTS AT LAW
•OUTH MAIN
O . SOX 7Z«
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the Complaint was filed in this matter.

1

A.

That both the Plaintiff and Defendant are good

2

parents, and that both parties could be awarded custody of

3

the minor children.

4

B. That the marriage entered into between Plaintiff

5

and Defendant was broken by the actions on the part of

6

Plaintiff, which were not justified.

7

C.

That when the Plaintiff vacated the family home in

8

Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in

9

September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in

10

approximately November or December of 1985, her sister,

11

another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together

12

with her minor child.

13

which Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary

14

custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what

15

it should have been nor was it in the best interests of the

16

children.

17

D.

That the standard of living under

That during the latter part of the marriage between

18

Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff became involved with

19

another man and this fact had an influence with the Court in

20

determining what is in the best interests of the minor

2 1 I)

children.

^ \

E.

That during the latter years of the marriage,

23

Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that change was not in the

24

best interests of the family unit, but rather the change was

25 I

pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the
exclusion of the family unit.

1

6.

That by reason of the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

2

Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor

3

children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective

4

July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested

5

in the Plaintiff# including, but not limited to the following

6

specific visitation privileges:

7

A.

Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m.

8

and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided however, that for

9

each Sunday while the children are in the care of the

10

Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church

11

and it can be a church of their choice.

12

B.

Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of

13

July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are

14

to remain in the care of the Defendant.

15

C.

A six-week visitation with the minor children

16

during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987,

17

at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties.

18

7.

By reason of the fact that the care of the minor

19

children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award

20

child support to either party.

21
22
23
24
25

8.

The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to

alimony.
9.

The assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant are

awarded as follows:
A.

The family home located in Central, Sevier County,

Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt
AMBERLAIN
k HIGBEE
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1

thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and

2

discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from

3

the payment of the same.

4

of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum

5

of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against

6

said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter

7

set forth.

8

follows:

9
10
11
12

Plaintiff is entitled to one-half

Said home is more particularly described as

Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04f,E for
2483.91* more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence
South along the west line of State Highway Right
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31f; thence,
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31f to the
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more
or less.

13
B.

The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties

14
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum
15
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
4AMBERLA1N
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one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each.

The

farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be
distributed as hereinafter set forth.

The remaining 43.5

acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described
as follows:
PARCEL 1:
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55
chains; thence West 15,77 chains; thence North

10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains;
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway;
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said
railway to the place of beginning, containing
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section
15.
PARCEL 2:
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14,
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North,
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains;
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West
10.50
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx.
15.61 acres.
Excluding therefrom:
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for
2483.91f more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running
thence South along the west line of State
Highway Right of Way, for 104 f , thence West
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104f; thence
East for 192.31f to the point of beginning
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 3:
Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14f East along East
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains,
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35'
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less.
6

C.

The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby

awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in
said equipment,
D.

Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of

$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property.
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a
lien against the farm property
amount and when the

farm

above-described

is sold as ordered

in said
herein,

Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250,
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant.

If

the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a
five year period, in yearly installments, together with
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum.
E.

The proceeds that will be available for

distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant.

I

F.

1

The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that

2

is surplus water over and above that which is needed to

3

irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per

4

share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June

5

18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided

6

equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
G.

7
8

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the

personal property now in their possession.

9

H.

The photographs and family albums now in the

10

possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the

11

Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to

12

reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days

13

thereafter.

14

family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the

15

same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff

16

to the Defendant.

17

10.

At the end of thirty days, said photographs and

The Court finds that as of June 18th, 1986, Plaintiff

18

receives as net income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and

19

Defendant receives net income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month.

20

11.

The Court finds that Defendant has a vested interest in

21

his retirement by reason of his U.S. Government employment in the

22

approximate sum of $18,000, as of June 18th, 1986, and that

23

Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title and interest

24

in said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled

25

to $6,000 by reason of said vested interest.
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Said sum shall be

1

payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period,

2

together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum, payable at

3

the rate of $600.00 per year, together with accrued interest,

4

with the first annual payment of principal and interest to be

5

paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and

6

continuing thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until

7

the entire principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued

8

interest is paid in full.

9

said amount at any time without penalty.

10

12.

Defendant shall be entitled to prepay

Defendant shall be required

to maintain health and

11

accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any

12

medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance,

13

Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same.

14

13.

The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant

15

after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party incurring the

16

same, with the exception of the medical and dental bills which

17

have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor children, which

18

shall be paid by Defendant as per the Temporary Order of the

19

Court dated October 2nd, 1985.

20

bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each required to

21

first submit the same to their respective carrier for payment and

22

in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall thereafter pay

23

and discharge said medical and dental expenses.

24
25
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14.

In connection with said medical

The Court finds that neither party is entitled to an

award of attorney's fees.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

2

1.

That Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

3

the Defendant, final upon entry, upon the grounds of physical and

4

mental cruelty.

5

2.

The care, custody and control of the minor children is

6

hereby awarded to the Defendant, effective July 1st, 1986, upon

7

the terms and conditions as set forth above.

8
9
10

3.

That the Decree of Divorce include and be consistent

with the Findings of Fact as above set forth.
DATED t h i s

>£X ~~~ day o f _ A u s m s i ^ l 9 8 6 ,

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

20
21
22

dXkx^^- S/U/K
[D L. MOWER
Attorney^for Plaintiff

23
2
25

IS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
>rney for Defendant

:HAMBERLAIN
& H1GBEE
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10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
to Mr. David L. Mower, JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main,
Richfield, Utah 84701, first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd
day of September, 1986.

11

EXHIBIT "C"

^v.v,- COUNTV
RECCIVEO
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1385 SEP-3
1
2
3
4

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

u»lS

POUL-OK-CLERh

5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
6
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
7
8

KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT,

9

Plaintiff,

10

vs.

11

DONALD J. MARCHANT,

12

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 9605

Defendant.

13
This matter having been tried to the Court, sitting without
14
a jury, on June 18th, 1986.

On said date, Plaintiff having

15
appeared, together with her attorney of record, David L. Mower,
16
and Defendant having appeared, together with his attorney, Hans
17
Q. Chamberlain, and Plaintiff and Defenant having been sworn to
18
testify concerning said matter together with other witnesses,
19
and the Court having been fully advised in the matter and having
20
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefor;
21
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DCREED that said
22
Plaintiff be granted a Decree of Divorce

from Defendant

23
providing as follows:
24
1.

The Decree of Divorce shall bcome final upon the filing

25
of the same in the office of the Sevier County Clerk.
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1

2.

That two children were adopted by the parties, namely,

2

Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena

3

Marchant, born April 22, 1977.

4

concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court

5

dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with

6

Plaintiff in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been

7

visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from

8

his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City,

9

Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and

10

thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on

11

Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in

12

Central, Utah.

13

3.

Pursuant to a Stipulation

That pursuant to the Finding of Fact made herein, the

14

Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor

15

children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective

16

July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested

17

in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following

18

specific visitation privileges:

19

A*

Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m.

20

and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided, however, that for

21

each Sunday while the children are in the care of the

22

Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church

23

and it can be a church of their choice.

24
25

B.

Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of

July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are
to remain in the care of the Defendant.
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1
2

during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987,

3

at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties.

4

4.

That by reason of the fact that the care of the minor

5

children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award

6

child support to either party.

7
8
9

5.

That the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to

alimony.
6.

That the assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant

10

are awarded as follows:

11

A.

The family home located in Central, Sevier County,

12

Dtahf is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt

13

thereon which Defendant shall be required to pay and

14

dischargef and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from

15

the payment of the same.

16

of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum

17

of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against

18

said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter

19

set forth.

20

follows:

21
22
23
24
25
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& H1GBEE
O M i r i AT l > w
lO ©OUTM MAI*
'. O. M X T»«

CfOAJt Cmr.
UTAX

A six-week visitation with the minor children
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Plaintiff is entitled to one-half

Said home is more particularly described as

Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04,,E for
2483.91 • more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence
South along the west line of State Highway Right
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31*; thence,
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31' to the
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more
or less.

B.

The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties

located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to
one-half of said equityf or the sum of $21,750 each. The
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be
distributed as hereinafter set forth.

The remaining 43.5

acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described
as follows:
PARCEL 1;
Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South 1.55
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains;
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway;
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said
railway to the place of beginning, containing
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section
15.
PARCEL 2:
Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14,
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North 2.88
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North,
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains;
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx.
15.61 acres.

4

1

Excluding therefrom;
Beginning at a point lying N 79*53•O^E for
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running
thence South along the west line of State
Highway Right of Way, for 104f, thence West
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104•; thence
East for 192.31f to the point of beginning
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less.

2
3
4
5
6

PARCEL 3:
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14' East along East
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains,
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35'
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less.

14
15

C.

The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby

16

awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant

17

shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in

18

said equipment.

19

D.

Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of

20

$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property.

21

To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a

22

lien against the farm property above-described

23

amount and when the farm is sold as ordered herein,

24

Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250,

25

and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant.
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If

the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a
five year period, in yearly installments, together with
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum.
E.

The proceeds that will be available for

distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant.
F.

The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that

is surplus water over and above that which is needed to
irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per
share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June
18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided
equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
G.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the

personal property now in their possession.
H.

The photographs and family albums now in the

possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to
reproduce any of said photographs within thirty days

6

1

thereafter. At the end of thirty days, said photographs and

2

family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the

3

same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff

4

to the Defendant.

5

and interest in his retirement account with the D.S. Government,

7

said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to

8

$6,000 by reason of said vested interest.

9

payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period,

10

together with interest, payable at the rate of $600.00 per year,

11

together with accrued interest at the rate of 8% per annum, with

12

the first annual payment of principal and interest to be paid by

13

the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and continuing

14

thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until the entire

15

principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued interest is

16

paid in full.

17

at any time without penalty.

».

O.

medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance!

21

Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same.
That the debts accumulated between Plaintiff and

Defendant after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party

24

incurring the same, with the exception of the medical and dental

25

bills which have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor

L>«*

CITY.

9.

23

MAIN

UTAH B47XO

That Defendant shall be required to maintain health and

£0

BOX 7ft«

CKDAR

Defendant shall be entitled to prepay said amount

accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any

HAMBERLAIN
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8.

Said sum shall be

19

22

SO § O l / T M

That Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title

6

18

rOKMCYS

7.

1

children, which shall be paid by Defendant.

2

said medical bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each

3

required to first submit the same to their respective carrier for

4

payment and in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall

5

thereafter pay and discharge said medical and dental expenses.

6
7

10.

In connection with

That neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's

fees.
A.O

8

DATED this

2%

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

18
19
20

{
22

23
24
25
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S Q. CBHRBERLAIN
ttorney for Defendant

day of August, 1986.

1
2

the within and foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to Mr. David L. Mov

4

JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, Richfield, Utah 8470

5

first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of September, 19(

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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CITY,
B47XO

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy

3

6

ATTOHMCf*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

EXHIBIT "D"

Karen S. Marchant

FINANCIAL DECLARATION
^ C m 5 Monthly Income

/

2 Co** KJS> ^ )

Taxes

%

J'^-™

ZiV.lt

Social Security
Savings Plan
Net Monthly Income

~Cr

$ u*n&

Monthly Expenses
Rent or Mortgage

550-00

Real Property Insurance

25.00

Maintainance

50.00

Food & Household Supplies

400.00

Utilities'

135.00

Telephone

40.00

Laundry and cleaning

25.00

Clothing

150.00

Medical

75.00

Dental

50.00

Insurance

30.00

Child Care

100.00

School

80.00

Entertainment

80.00

Incidentals (Grooming, Gifts, Etc.)

200.00

Auto expenses

150.00

Installment payments
Total Expenses

80.00
$ 2,220.00
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EXHIBIT "F"

t

Mower.

2

MR. MOWER:

Thank you, Your

3

[WHEREUPON

the

4

first part

of his c l o s i n g

5

THE C O U R T :

Mr.

6

[WHEREUPON

it le

argument,

Plaintiff's

Def endai it ' s

8

completed his closing argument.]

which

in

all h o n e s t y .

Court,

12

have sat h e r e all d a y and w h e n

13

whole morning,

14

to prison, w h e r e p r o b a b l y

You know

16

and on each one of

18

I don't

Y o u didn't

justify

20

over

21

anyone else, total and

22

fits, b r o k e n homes, p r o b l e m s

23

and drugs,

24 J! graduated

25

civvr

j

for

I just k n o w that you

I sent

them

they c a m e

the

folks

matters

the

four young

men

see the presentence

I see in

again.

i

go,

things

reports

from

that

separated

n just saying

those cases

that's

the sajne p a t t e r n ,

T h e y g i v e n o t h i n g of t h e m s e l v e s

complete living

crime,

and

I sit and grant

for then1

in s c h o o l , a n d
then

into the c r i m i n a l system

And then

Plaintiff

cases

I h a n d l e criminal

their conduct,

what

and

his

them.

19

it c o m e s from

the

a lot m o r e are going to

see.

17 || families, every cne of

pi esent ed

for

difficult

one after a n o t h e r w h e r e

15 J you didn't
I examined,

the

RULTNGS

These are very

11

Counsel

Counsel

C O U R T FIKDIICGS &
THE COURT:

presented

Chamberlain?

closing

10

Counsel

argument,]

7

9

after

Honor.

then

<•* 1 1
and

divorces

I f v e got

to

ow i: i bene-

It's alcohol
a

sudden

it's

them.

the rest of

the day
PAGE
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1

Law & Motion days.

2

today.

3

I approve the stipulations .

4

in awhile I get one like this where the parties are obviously

5

good people, fatit things have gone wrong and

6

I've got

7

that they're in.

8

don f t think

9

make the best decision I can

10

Think of the number of divorces I granted

Most of them are stipulations.

to start

They just come in and

They go out • ai id thei : eve ?r y once

trying to

make a

And frankly,

all of

a sudden

decision from the mess

it's traumatic

to me.

You

it is, but it's my i 'esponsibi 1 ity to hear it and
make

and

I

obviously

a^m not

going to make people happy in that job from what I find.

But

H II that's what I do as I see it.
12
1

As I see it,

3 |j interest of

this

case

basically,

it f s

the best

those children and I have 1 leard the evidence and

14

I have to do what I think is right at this point

15

less of

whet*3 "he

problems fall.

16

|| Counsel have submitted

17

|| everything else.

18

" a n d I'm making it at this time.

19

for

the

And

exhibits

and regard-

ppreciate the way
and

the

evidence and

And be that as it may, this is my decision
Frankly,, I'm

having a vei: y

difficult time finding grounds for a divorce,

20

I 1 I I he

Honest

1 have difficulty with what the Plain-

21

tiff sues, alleges grounds.

22

this

Defendants

23

her.

Maybe that was justified

24

don't believe

25

having difficulty.

done

1 have difficulty

anything

finding where

wrong, other than slapping
1

dot l't bel ieve

it :i it.

anyone should use force and violence.
However, under the

I

But I'm

ciicurastances I don't
PAGE 130

1

see w h e r e

2

that

3

Plaintiff

4

physical a n g u i s h b e c a u s e he

5

w h e n he

6

I can

I'm g o i n g

force them

to

find

cruelly,

that

causing

II that f a c t , the P l a i n t i f f
which u n d e r

8

be

9

the

her

Defendant

did

treat

on the

is a w a r d e d

occasion

Based

the decree

the

anguish,

one

to me highly p r o v o k e d .

on

upon

of d i v o r c e ,

I think these p a r t i e s have

to

divorced.
N o r m a l l y , I'll
but

11

become a b s o l u t e and

12

i n t e r l o c u t o r y period

13

be d i v o r c e d and

14

continued.

15

The

I'm

leave the

tence,

Court

16 II corrals and

going

I

to

final

i n t e r l o c u t o r y * period
terminate

u p o n the

being w a i v e d

see no

awards

the 1 1/2

advantage

the

a c r e s of

assume the debt and

19

debts

20

517 000 equil :y

21

g o i n g to hold that off for a m o m e n t 4

and

The

the

Defendant

ho1d

the

obligations.

Court:

23

approximately

24

the Court

The

that

43 a c r e s of

finds

the

I think they must

anyone to

have

located

in this a c t i o n ,

I > 1aii I11f f 1 iarm1ess

house as

finds

shall

this entry,

land w i t h home

18

Marchant,

This decree

date of

to

in e x i s -

that

p a r c e l of real property with

to

Mr.

it.

because

17

25

So based

physical and m e n t a l

the c i r c u m s t a n c e s

10

22

together.

s t r u c k her

was what appeared

7

to ]ive

the
land

Court

finds

of this

parties
that's

the

thereon
He shall
frora those

that she h a s a

date and

have

a

I'm

just

home w i t h

not i disposable >

which

is v a l u e d at $ 2 , 0 0 0 an a c r e and has a debt

it of a p p r o x i m a t e l y

$ 1 , 0 0 0 an a c r e ,

so that

the Court

on

finds
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j

there is a $43,500 value of that propei
Now let

me just make sure I'm not missing this.

43.5 acres valued at

$2,000

an

acre

with

debt

There's
on

it of

approximately $1,000 per acre; that's right, isn't it?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
THE COURT:
equity in

So that the Court tuu.li there's ',.43,500

that property

finds that

Yes.

that tlle

the Plaintiff

that $43,500, or she has
The Court

finds that

parties have.

has consequently
$21,750

equity

The Court

1 lalf interest in
in

that property.

there's another $8,000 due and each of

the parties are entitled to $4,000 of that money.
The Court finds that they
The

Court

orders

that

have

water

shall be sold by the Defendant

assets

in

water stock.

stock so J d at this time.
within a

period of

It

one year

and the proceeds 50 percent to each of the parties.
The

Court

finds

that

they

have

$5,000 worth of farm

equipment and the Court finds that there was some division of
a household
that the
partlif

lurmfure and a

Defendant
Interest

should

.i- .t**
pay

<•

* .oincj to say
llaintiff

for the

in the farm equipment the sum of $1#500 and

he's awarded the farm equipment.
If my mathematics are right, I'rn adding $17,000, $21,750,
and $4 ,000, and

my mathematics are c o n e :::t j t comes out to

$42,750; do you agree with that, gentlemen?
that's what

it is.

The

Check it.

Well,

Plaintiff is awarded the judgement
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1

against the Defendant for that $ 4 2 , 7 5 0 .

2
3

The farm shall be sold w i t h i n

of o n e

year and

II all of tt ie pi: oceeds of that farm shall be applied against the

4
5

a period

$42,750II d o e s n ! t

The balance w i l l go to the D e f e n d a n t .
bring

the

$42,750,

then the Plaintiff will have a

6

judgement against the Defendant

7

be payable

8

over a 5- year period, on an annua ] basis .

9 II

12

THE C O U R T :

net takehome

baJdui «e (l wtijuh wi.ll

I'm s o r r y , five years?

Five y e a r s .

The Court m a k e s the
has a

Joi the

at the rate of 8 percent per annum

MR. C H A M B E R L A I N :

10
11

w i t h interest

If the farm

s p e c i f i c finding

that the Plaintiff

of $1,321 p e r m o n t h , the Defendant has a

*3 || net of $2,114 a m o n t h .
14

All of the D e f e n d a n t ' s right to title and interest in and

15

to his retirement shall be awarded to the D e f e n d a n t , subject,

16

h o w e v e r , that he

17

$ 6 , 0 0 0 , which

18

at $600 in*? yi'ai

19

percent per

20

earlier, if he w a n t s to, but

21

direction.

22 II
23
24

shall

pay

$6,000 shall
foi ] 11

annum on

to

the

the

sum of

be payable over a 10-year period

yciMrs together

the unpaid

MR. MOWER:

Plaintiff

it

with inter'1" I,

balance.
shall

be

E x c u s e m e , Your H o n o r

'-i t H

So he c a n pay it
payable

in that

That m e a n s that

he will pay $600 p l u s .
THE COURT:

Plus I n t e r e s t .

Aiid I 11

25 IJ annual b a s i s , any p a r t i c u l a r time y o u want to.

make it

on an

We'll aake it
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1

on September 1st of each year,

W e l l , this year we'll make it

2

on June 1st, starting on June 1st, 1987.

3

Nc: Attorneys fees are awarded to either party

*

The Court

5
6

specifically finds

that no

alimony should be

awarded to either party in this m a t t e r ,
The Court finds that both p a r t i e s

are good

parents*, and

7

both parties

could be awarded custody of the minor children.

8

The Court: d o e s , however, find

tl lat

9

broken up

Plaintiff, and the Court finds

by actions

of the

~:\\-\

marriage

has been

10

that they are not justified.

11

have been

12

commenced, by prior order of the Court, the

13

opinion that in the best interest of the children the custody

14

should be awarded to the D e f e n d a n t .

15

in the

And even

though these children

P l a i n t i f f ' s custody

since this action was

The Plaintiff is awarded the right
reasonable times

Court is

of the

of reasonable v i s i t a -

16

tion at

and p l a c e s .

17

question on v i s i t a t i o n rights, the Plaintiff is awarded every

18

o11 iei • holiday,

*9

Christmas w h e r e the children

20

custodial parent.

21

The Court

commencing with

finds that

six w e e k s v i s i t a t i o n iti this

23

that time " wl a n i she d e s i r e s .

25

[PLAINTIFF began

that there is no

11 ie 411 i of Ju 1 y

shall stay

In the

excej: >t for
h o m e of the

the Plaintiff shall be a w a r d e d for

22

24 ||

So

summer

crying and

at

a

six-week period,

collapsed to the floor

at her C o u n s e l ! s table in the C o u r t r o o m . ]
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THE COURT:
party.

Nc Attorneys fees are awarded

You better call in the EMT f $.
[WHEREUPON the

Bailiff responded

ale ).ng with family

members of the Plaintiff and her Counsel, Mr,
the

to either

Plaintiff

out

of

the

Courtroom

and

Mower, to help
to give aid and

assistance to her.]
THE COURT:

Do you want

me to

go forward. Counsel,

or dc you want me to wait?
MR,

MOWER:

I

thmK

you ought to go forward.

I

think it will be some time for her to gain her composure.
THE COURT:
that the

AJI right.

Defendant shall

It's the order of

the Court

find findings of fact, conclusions

of law and decree for the

conformity of

11 i Is record.

For

the purpose of the record I think that I should make a record
that the Plaintiff is

very emotional

because of

this order

and has collapsed in the Courtroom.
The Court

makes specific findings that the Plaintiff has

taken these children to Salt
under Court

order, that

Lake

wl i;i,!e

they have?

minor

child

in

th^*f

action was

been

standard of living and

had them

divorced woman having

apartment, and the Court is of the

opinion that the change
had has

has

been living in an apart-

ment, jointly with her sister who is a
a

she

standards

custody

since

compliance?
these

this divorce

witl i tt ie normal

parties

had before

thir; action was filed.
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1

The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff has

2

become involved with another man and that was a factor in the

3

Court's decision.

4

The Court

5
6

makes a

specific finding that the Plaintiff's

lifestyle has changed and
(I longer for

7

the family

that her

unit, but

concern is
tor the

||

9

|j you would

Now gentlemen, I want to make any findings

that you feel

like me to make for the purpose of the record, and

10

Mr. Mower, if you have something you'd like

11

state it now, please.

12

||

13

II Court to schedule a

MR. MOWER:

I

think it

transfer

me to

find, you

would be important for the

based

on

the

Court's order

There's going to be need for a change on the custody.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

17

* .-..-.com-

purpos

piishing her own desires

8

14

basically no

Has school terminated?
On the 14th, it terminated in Salt

Lake, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Transfer will be

made on

July 1st,

I

19

believe I

20

I'm gojmj in male specific visitation,

21

take the

22

they shall be returned by 7:00 o'clock.

23

by Friday at 6:00 p m , r eturn them by 7:00 p.m. Sunday.

24

the children shall attend church of there choice so that they

25

shall be in church in view of the lifestyle of these parties.

better make these rights of reasonable visitation.
she shall

be able 'to

children every other Friday until Sunday iiiqlif when
So she can take them
But
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1

MR- CHAMBERLAIN:

Your

Honor, just one question on

2

the

3

continuing with

4

effect that might have on the children to

5

raise that for discussion.

date

6
7

of

change.

The

the 4th

THE COURT:

Well,

maybe we

The 24th.

9

THE COURT:

All right.

change and

better make »

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

12

THE

COURT:

it on the

They'll have

visitation on

Instead of the 4th?

Instead

of

the

4th,

Now, is there

anything else, Mr. Mower?

14

MR. MOWER:

15

THE COURT:

I don't have anything further.
I'd

like

to,

if

you

can

think of

anything I missed, I want to make a complete record.

17

MR. MOWER:

Nothing else I can think of.

18

THE COURT:

Mr. Chamberlain?

19

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

20

THE COURT:

21

gentlemen.

22

help that,

23

I just

the 24th.

11

16

her visitation

following holiday.
MR. MOWER:

13

awarded

of July and I'm wondering about the

8

10

Court

No.

I think not, Your Honor.

Thank you

I'm s o n y

It "s bvv.

appreciate your courtesy,
J traumatic,

This Court will be in recess.

If you']1

prepare your

24

law and submit them

25

before you

but I, c<m't

Thank you.

findings of fact, conclusions of

to opposing

Counsel at

least five days

send them to me, I111 assume that they're correct
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When I get them.
2 II
3

So make your findings.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

sign them because of the time.

4

MR. MOWER:

5

THE COURT:

6

9 I]

I appreciate that
Thank

you.

This

Court

will

be in

recess,

7
8

I wil1 submit them and ask him to

(WHEREUPON Proceedings

were completed in the matter

herein.]
—ooOoo—

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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